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THE SECRET LIFE OF THE POLITICAL 
QUESTION DOCTRINE 
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN· 
"Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be 
. made in this court."l 
The irony, of course, is that Marbury v. Madison, itself, 
"made" a political question, and the answer the Court gave was 
deeply political as well. As everyone reading this essay knows, the 
case arose out of a bitter political controversy,2 and the opinion for 
the Court was a carefully crafted political document-"a 
masterwork of indirection," according to Robert McCloskey's well-
known characterization, "a brilliant example of Chief Justice 
Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while seemingly to court it, 
to advance in one direction while his opponents are looking in 
another. ,,3 
The purpose of this essay is to explore the many layers of this 
irony. I will argue that despite all of the premature reports of its 
demise, the political question doctrine is as central to modern 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Lama 
Abu-Odeh, Vicki Jackson, Neal Katyal, Michael Klarman, Roy Schotland, 
David Seidman, and Mark Tushnet for comments on a previous version of this 
article and to Moneen Nasmith for outstanding research assistance. 
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
2. The case came about because of last minute efforts by the defeated 
Federalists to retain control of the federal judiciary after their defeat in the 
election of 1800. (The behavior of Federalist judges, especially their 
enforcement of the controversial Alien and Sedition Acts, had been an issue in 
the election). In the immediate wake of the election, the Federalist Congress 
established six circuit courts with sixteen additional judges to be appointed by 
the outgoing administration. In addition, President Adams appointed forty-
two new justices of the peace for Alexandria and the District of Columbia, one 
of whom was Marbury. The commissions were to be delivered by the 
Secretary of State - none other than John Marshall, who was serving in this 
post while also Chief Justice of the United States. Marshall failed to deliver 
the commission for Marbury and, when the incoming Jefferson administration 
refused to provide him with the commission, Marbury sued. For standard 
accounts of these events, see James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
219 (1992); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 
1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-5. 
3. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 25 (3d ed. 
2000). 
441 
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constitutional adjudication as it was to the outcome in Marbury at 
the beginning of our constitutional history. Moreover, the irony at 
Marbury's core continues to haunt the doctrine two hundred years 
later. Now, as then, application of the doctrine requires courts to 
resolve political questions-the very activity the doctrine purports 
to avoid. Now, as then, this contradiction mocks Chief Justice 
Marshall's confident assertion that "[i]f some acts be examinable, 
and others not, there must be some rule of law to guide the court 
in the exercise of its jurisdiction."4 As we shall see, the effort to 
make the political question problem into a "doctrine"5-to bound it 
by a rule of law-is a fool's errand. The difficulty posed by 
political question jurisprudence is not that the court has 
sometimes politicized law, but that it has never successfully 
legalized politics. 
My argument should not be confused with the claim that the 
Court is often influenced by politics in the partisan sense, 
although I must confess that it is hard to extinguish the suspicion 
that this claim may have been true in 1803, when Marbury was 
decided and may remain true in our own day. For purposes ofthis 
paper, however, I mean nothing more by "politics" than a set of 
criteria for decisionmaking that are outside the domain of 
constitutional law. My argument, then, is that the Court has 
never-and never can-develop constitutional rules that control 
the political judgments, as so understood, that it regularly makes. 6 
Moreover, because political questions operate outside of 
constitutional law, the political question doctrine must lead a 
secret life. In theory, the Court's abstention from deciding 
political questions insulates judges from politics so that they can 
resolve legal disputes. In fact, a proper understanding of the 
doctrine fatally undermines Marshall's famous claim that "[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.,,7 
It might be thought, therefore, that the political question 
doctrine supports Marbury's modern critics, who would vest 
constitutional interpretation exclusively in the political branches. 
It turns out that even though the doctrine undermines Marbury's 
reasoning, it also weakens the argument of Marbury's opponents. 
In short, the political question doctrine is the most dangerous 
4. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165. 
5. For convenience, I will abandon the scarequotes in the remainder of this 
essay. It should be understood nonetheless that I mean to problematize the 
"doctrinal" character of the political question doctrine. 
6. In this sense, my position differs from Mark Tushnet's. See Mark V. 
Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation 
and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203 
(2002). I share Tushnet's view that the Court has attempted to doctrinalize 
political questions. We seem to differ about whether it has succeeded. 
7. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
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concept in all of constitutional law. Despite heroic efforts from all 
quarters to domesticate it, the doctrine has merely remained 
underground, from whence it continues to lash out in all 
directions.s 
My argument for and elaboration of these conclusions will be 
organized as follows: the aim of Part One is to disentangle three 
strands of the doctrine. My claim here is that two of the three 
strands are relatively unimportant 'because they are really 
disguised legal decisions about the merits of constitutional 
disputes. The only strand that amounts to anything addresses the 
question whether the Court should obey requirements of the 
Constitution as those requirements are best understood by the 
Justices. This strand turns out to amount to quite a bit. Although 
the literature often refers to it as the "prudential" strand,9 this 
label is deeply misleading. In fact, this version of the political 
question doctrine can serve to support as well as inhibit judicial 
intervention in political disputes. For example, some 
commentators have criticized the Court's controversial decision in 
Bush u. Gore10 on the ground that the Court should have invoked 
the political question doctrine. ll These commentators have 
assumed that invocation of the doctrine would have led to judicial 
abstention. But as Richard Posner has demonstrated, the best 
defense of Bush 12 is that the Court did invoke the doctrine (albeit 
8. My views are therefore similar to those of Robert Nagel, who wrote over 
a decade ago that: 
Like many dangerous things, [the political question doctrine) has been 
given a safe appearance and name. But what looks like a slight crack is 
a fault line. This doctrine, so frequently criticized and discounted, 
nevertheless, has a tenacious hold on our jurisprudence. After two 
hundred years of growth and consolidation, the nation's judicial system 
is an imposing edifice built over a break that looks small but does not go 
away. 
Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the 
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 643 (1989). 
9. This strand was more or less originated by Alexander Bickel, who 
treated it as an aspect of judicial prudence. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
11-198 (1962). Modern commentators have generally adhered to this view. 
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question,» 79 
Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1984) (associating Bickel's views with the 
"prudential" branch of the doctrine). 
10. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
11. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the 
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 237, 295-300 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 637 (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing 
Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARv. L. REV. 170, 276-87 (2001). 
12. I use these words advisedly. I don't mean to suggest that it is a 
particularly good defense. For my analysis of the problems with both the 
opinion and the result, see Louis Michael Seidman, What's So Bad about Bush 
v. Gore? An Essay on Our Unsettled Election, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 953 (2001). 
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secretly) and that that invocation led to judicial intervention. 13 
In Part Two, I argue that this version of the doctrine is much 
more important to the Supreme Court's daily work than is 
commonly supposed. Indeed, it is ubiquitous and irrepressible. If 
this claim is correct, one might wonder why so many observers of 
the Court have failed to notice the doctrine's importance. My 
answer is that the real political question doctrine cannot speak its 
own name. Candid recognition of the doctrine's existence-the 
doctrinalization of the political question doctrine-turns it into 
something else. Thus, the doctrine is both ubiquitous and hidden. 
Finally, in Part Three, I briefly explore some of the 
implications of these observations. I conclude that the secret life 
of the political question doctrine challenges not only Chief Justice 
Marshall's argument in Marbury, but also the arguments of many 
of Marshall's modern critics. 
1. THREE VERSIONS OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
There is not a single political question doctrine, but three 
separate doctrines, and the failure to distinguish among the three 
has produced much confusion. Chief Justice Marshall articulated 
the first version when he wrote that in cases where "the executive 
possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more 
perfectly clear than that [his] acts are only politically 
examinable."14 I call this the "faux" political question doctrine 
because, as many others have observed, the doctrine does no work 
not already done by substantive provisions of constitutional law. 
Some of the most perceptive students of the political question 
doctrine-most prominently Louis Henkin-have thought that this 
was all, or virtually all, that the doctrine amounted to. 15 However, 
many other commentators have focused on a second version of the 
doctrine, which might be labeled the "interpretive authority" 
theory. 16 On this view, the Constitution vests in the political 
branches final interpretive authority as to the meaning of some 
constitutional provisions. Unlike the "faux" doctrine, this version 
does not, in principle, consist of an empty set. Nonetheless, I 
argue below that in practice the interpretive authority approach 
almost always collapses into either the first category or the third, 
which I have labeled the "secret" political question doctrine. 
13. See RICHARD POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, THE 2000 ELECTION, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 162 (2001). 
14. Marbury, 5 U.s. (1 Cranch) at 166. 
15. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE 
L.J. 597,622-23 (1976). 
16. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 239. Although he used different 
terminology, this was, in essence, the view held by Herbert Wechsler. See 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. 
L. REV. 1,7-8 (1959). 
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The third approach-the secret political question doctrine-
takes seriously the fact that no normative principle can establish 
its own legitimacy. Hence, even if the answer to a constitutional 
question is clear, courts must always decide whether they should 
abide by that answer. Application of this sort of political question 
doctrine cannot be determined by legal analysis because it 
concerns an antecedent question about the bindingness of legal 
analysis. It follows that courts cannot acknowledge in a legal 
opinion that they are applying the doctrine, because any such 
acknowledgment would require legal analysis. 
A. Faux Political Questions 
In his initial formulation of the political question doctrine, 
Chief Justice Marshall seemed to have believed that application of 
doctrine was something different from a decision on the merits. 
Thus, before reaching the merits, he asked whether "the act of 
delivering or withholding a commission [is] a mere political act, 
belonging to the executive department alone, for the performance 
of which, entire confidence is placed by our constitution in the 
supreme executive; and for any misconduct respecting which, the 
injured individual has no remedy."17 Although ultimately 
concluding that the particular act before him did not fall into this 
category, he left no doubt that some other unspecified acts did. IS 
But which acts? Marshall's silence on this point created a 
puzzle that has lasted two centuries. If, indeed, the Constitution 
places "entire confidence" in the executive with regard to some 
acts, then, it would seem, the Constitution is not violated when the 
President performs those acts. But if there is no constitutional 
violation, then the President will win the case on the merits and 
there will be no need to resort to preliminary, political question 
analysis. Conversely, if the President has violated the relevant 
constitutional provisions, then the Constitution has not placed 
"entire confidence" in him, and the political question doctrine 
therefore fails to shield his conduct from judicial review. In either 
event, political question analysis is superfluous; precisely the 
same results follow from straightforward constitutional 
interpretation. 19 
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164. 
18. After the sentence quoted in text, Marshall added: "That there may be 
such cases is not to be questioned." [d. 
19. The tendency to conflate the political question doctrine with the merits 
is not limited to the doctrine's defenders. For example, in his book-length 
attack on application of the political question doctrine to foreign affairs, 
Thomas F. Franck shifts seamlessly between criticism of judicial abstention 
and criticism of a substantive constitutional interpretation that leaves the 
President unconstrained. THOMAS F. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL 
ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAw APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS 18 (1992). 
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Two of the Court's most recent decisions concerning the 
political question doctrine usefully illustrate this familiar point. 
In Walter Nixon v. United States, a former district judge 
challenged his removal from office following his impeachment by 
the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate.20 His 
claim on the merits was that he had not been "tried" within the 
meaning of the Constitution's impeachment clause because the 
actual trial procedures occurred before a Senate committee rather 
than the full body. Purporting to avoid the merits of this claim, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion argued that the case 
posed a nonjusticiable political question. The Chief Justice relied 
upon two indicia of political questions earlier identified in Baker v. 
Carr21-viz., that there was "a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department" and that there was "a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it.,,22 
How does one determine whether these indicia are satisfied? 
Here is where the shuffle begins. In order to determine whether 
there is a textually demonstrable commitment and judicially 
manageable standards, the Court tells us, we must decide what 
the word "try" means as it is used in the impeachment clause. 
According to the Court 
The word "try," both in 1787 and later, has considerably broader 
meanings than those to which petitioner would limit it .... [W]e 
cannot say that the Framers used the word "try" as an implied 
limitation on the method by which the Senate might proceed in 
trying impeachments .... 
We agree with Nixon that courts possess power to review either 
legislative or executive action that transgresses identifiable textual 
limits. . . . But we conclude... that the word "try" in the 
Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual 
limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate.23 
It should be obvious that this holding amounts to a 
determination that Nixon's constitutional rights were not violated. 
Like many constitutional provisions, the impeachment clause 
affords Congress discretion-in this case, discretion in its choice of 
methods by which an impeached official is "tried." Because the 
Senate's conduct fell within this zone of discretion, Nixon had no 
Franck assails "[tlhe radical notion ... that the political discretion of the 
president in foreign affairs is neither circumscribed by the Constitution nor 
reviewable by the courts." [d. He fails to see that once it is established that 
the President's political discretion is not constitutionally circumscribed, it 
hardly matters whether or not it is reviewable by the courts. 
20. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
22. Nixon, 506 U.s. at 228; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
23. Nixon, 506 U.s. at 230,237-38. 
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ground for complaint. Had the Senate's conduct fallen outside the 
zone of discretion, it would have "transgress [ed] identifiable 
textual limits.,,24 This transgression, in turn, would have meant 
that there were ''judicially. discoverable and manageable 
standards"-viz., the textual limits. Moreover, the textual limits 
themselves would have demonstrated that there was no textual 
commitment permitting the Senate to use this method of trying 
impeachments. Thus, Nixon's case posed a political question only 
because he lost. If he had had a valid claim on the merits, the 
political question doctrine would not have shielded it from judicial 
vindication. 
The point is driven home by comparing Nixon to Davis v. 
Bandemer, where Justice White, writing for the plurality, and 
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, argued over 
application of the doctrine to the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering.25 In the end, one cannot help but wonder what 
all the shouting was about. 
Justice O'Connor's stated position was that the political 
question doctrine should shield issues of partisan gerrymandering 
from judicial review. However, even a superficial reading of her 
opinion makes clear that she believed this only because she also 
believed that the practice in question survived judicial review. On 
her view, "in order to [decide whether the case posed a political 
question], it is necessary to interpret the Equal Protection 
Clause."26 As she understood the Equal Protection Clause, "no 
group right to an equal share of political power was ever intended 
by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment."27 But this is the 
very sort of judgment on the merits that the political question 
doctrine is supposed to avoid. 
In contrast, Justice White's stated position was that the 
political question doctrine was inapplicable.26 It was therefore 
necessary for him to reach the merits. Once he did so, he 
concluded that the equal protection clause permitted political 
gerrymandering except in a very narrowly defined class of cases.29 
Just as O'Connor's position might be rephrased as a judgment on 
the merits, so too White's position might be expressed in political 
question language. So long as state legislatures stayed within the 
bounds of the rules White prescribed for them, their decisions were 
24. Id. at 238. 
25. 478 U.s. 109 (1986). 
26. Id. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
27. [d. at 147. 
28. [d. at 122-23. 
29. Justice White thought that political gerrymandering was 
unconstitutional only when there was "evidence of continued frustration of the 
will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a 
fair chance to influence the political process." [d. at 133. 
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within their "constitutional or legal discretion" and therefore "only 
politically examinable." Of course, in this sense every 
nonmeritorious constitutional case poses a political question. In 
every constitutional case, the· Court ,must decide whether a 
political branch has acted within the bounds of the discretion 
granted to it, and it is always true that if it has, its decision is not 
judicially examinable. But a doctrine that describes everything 
describes nothing, so this recharacterization of Justice White's 
opinion only reenforces the emptiness of political question analysis 
and serves to justify Justice White's choice to express his views in 
terms of the merits. 
Why, then, does Justice O'Connor use the arcane and indirect 
vocabulary of political questions to reach a similar set of 
conclusions? Perhaps the answer lies in another two-century-old. 
hangover from Marbury-the annoying habit of cloaking the 
exercise of judicial power in the language of self-abnegation. 
Neurotic tics that survive this long are notoriously difficult to· 
discard, especially when they reenforce useful self-delusions, as 
this one surely does. If this is, indeed, the source of the modern 
political question doctrine, then we hardly need worry much about 
it. As most of us know, some neuroses are relatively benign and 
not worth the effort to overcome. So long as no one is actually 
fooled into taking this version of the political question doctrine 
seriously, we can easily afford to indulge the Court's occasional 
relapses. 
B. The Interpretive Authority Theory 
In a well-known article published in 1976, Louis Henkin 
compared the faux doctrine with what he called "a meaningful 
political question doctrine."30 Such a doctrine, in his view, "would 
have it that ... some constitutional requirements are entrusted 
exclusively and finally to the political branches of government for 
'self-monitoring.",31 Unlike the faux doctrine, the version that 
Henkin described is, at least on first examination, neither benign 
nor logically deficient. The faux doctrine avoids the merits only by 
deciding them. In contrast, a "meaningful" doctrine would vest 
final interpretive authority in a branch of government other than 
the judiciary. For a court that followed this doctrine, there might 
be an authentic gap between its political question judgment and 
its judgment on the merits. Such a court might conclude that the 
Constitution entitled the plaintiff to relief, but nonetheless stay its 
hand on the ground that the political branches should have the 
final "say" when there was disagreement about the meaning of the 
30. Henkin, supra note 15, at 599. 
31. [d. 
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Constitution.32 
Henkin did not deny that such a doctrine might exist in 
principle. However, after a careful study of all the Court's then 
extant political question jurisprudence, he was doubtful that it did 
exist in fact and more doubtful still that it should exist. 
One must admire Henkin's resourcefulness and analytic 
acuity in reinterpreting and dismantling the foundations upon 
which the political question doctrine supposedly rested. Within 
only a few years of the article's publication, however, many 
scholars had concluded that he had managed to overlook most of 
what constitutional law was about. I speculate below on some 
explanations rooted in the intellectual history of legal liberalism 
for this changed perspective. Here, I want to suggest a simpler, 
terminological explanation. Henkin focused his attention on cases 
where the Court used the phrase "political question." Had he 
freed himself from this verbal formalism, he might have noticed 
that the Court regularly seemed to recognize the final interpretive 
authority of the other branches without quite saying so. 
Consider, for example, Katzenbach v. McClung, a case that 
was still recent enough to be salient at the time when Henkin 
wrote.33 In the course of upholding application of the public 
accommodations sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act34 to a local 
restaurant, against the argument that Congress had exceeded its 
commerce clause powers, the Court said the following: 
Congress has determined for itself that refusals of services to 
Negroes have imposed burdens both upon the interstate flow of food 
and upon the movement of products generally. Of course, the mere 
fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed 
to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this 
Court. But where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts 
and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a 
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, 
our investigation is at an end.35 
Although the Court nowhere used the phrase "political 
question," it is hard to make sense of this test without resort to the 
interpretative authority version of the doctrine. To see why this is 
so, imagine that Congress had made a mistake - albeit a "rational" 
mistake - in believing that the antidiscrimination provisions of the 
Act were necessary to protect commerce. As a substantive matter, 
the Constitution grants Congress power to protect commerce, not 
to engage in activity that someone might think protects commerce, 
but actually does not do so. Thus, as a substantive matter, a 
32. At least as I understand it, this was Herbert Wechsler's position. See 
Wechsler, supra note 16, at 9. 
33. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964). 
35. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04. 
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"rational basis" test seems incoherent. The Court's test makes 
sense only if one supposes that when there is disagreement about 
the substance-about what is or is not necessary to protect 
commerce-Congress has final interpretive authority so long as its 
judgment is "rational." 
Writing a few years after Henkin dismissed the political 
question doctrine, John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper produced two 
important syntheses of post-New Deal constitutionalism that 
emphasized the ubiquity of the McClung-like political questions.36 
Ely offered a political theory of democracy and discrimination that 
could be read as vesting interpretative authority over the 
Constitution's ambiguous provisions in the political branches 
except in circumstances where a defect in the political process 
prevented a democratic outcome.37 Choper added to Ely's political 
insights a richly supported empirical analysis of the built-in 
political protections for federalism and separation of powers that 
made judicial intervention superfluous. Taken together, Choper 
and Ely suggested that vast expanses of ordinary constitutional 
jurisprudence - from "rational basis" review for many equal 
protection and due process claims,3s to most cases involving the 
reach of congressional power,39 to famous constitutional chestnuts 
like Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer40 and United States v. 
Nixon 41-could best be understood by viewing them through the 
lens of political question. These ideas were, in turn, formalized 
and made more explicit in a seminal article by Lawrence Sager 
introducing the concept of "underenforcement" and focusing 
explicitly on the problem of institutional competence as central to 
the allocation of interpretive authority!2 
Ely, Choper, and Sager wrote mostly to defend Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. More recently, however, legal academics 
critical of the Rehnquist Court have converted the interpretive 
authority argument from a shield into a sword. AB a much more 
conservative Court has moved to reinvigorate its commerce clause 
review and reduce the scope of Congress' powers under section five 
of the fourteenth amendment, scholars such as Rachel Barkow,43 
36. See JORN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); JESSE H. 
CROPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). 
37. I use this cumbersome circumlocution advisedly. As I explain below, 
Ely himself would probably reject this characterization of his work. 
38. See ELY, supra note 36, at 14-21, 30-33. 
39. See CROPER, supra note 36, at 192-95, 245-46, 295, 330-34. 
40. See id. at 316-26 (discussing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.s. 579 (1952)). 
41. See id. at 336-42 (discussing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974)). 
42. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
43. See Barkow, supra note 11. 
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Vicki Jackson," Robert Post and Riva Segal,45 Mark Tushnet,46 and 
Larry Kramer47 have faulted the Justices for ignoring the 
coordinate interpretive authority of Congress. 
It is easy to historicize this waxing and waning of the 
interpretive authority theory so as to explain these shifts as 
ideological interventions. When Henkin wrote, liberal and leftist 
academics were still enjoying the afterglow of the Warren Court 
revolution. For scholars working in this period, it was simply 
assumed that an "activist" court would promote social progress. 
Hence, the tendency to dismiss the political question doctrine.48 
Four years later, when Ely and Choper published their books, the 
change in the political valence of judicial review was too obvious to 
ignore. Their work can be understood as attempts to shore up the 
prior accomplishments of the Warren Court, while distinguishing 
this "good" activism from the "bad" Lochner-like activism that had 
loomed so large in the past and that was just beginning to 
threaten the future. By the turn of the century, any lingering 
hopes for a revival of the Warren Court were long-since dead, and 
there were, in any event, growing doubts about whether the 
Warren Court had accomplished much oflasting value. Moreover, 
the threat of "bad" activism that might dismantle the remnants of 
the welfare state was much more real. The modern revival of a 
more generalized defense of the interpretive authority position is 
therefore hardly surprising. 
Suppose, though, that instead of his torici zing the interpretive 
authority position, we attempt to take it seriously on its own 
terms. Does the position make sense? My own view (offered as 
one who, uniquely, stands outside of history, of course) is that 
Henkin was probably right all along, albeit for reasons somewhat 
different from those that he offered. The difficulty is that the 
"interpretive authority" position tends to slide into either the 
"faux" position on one side or the "secret" position on the other. I 
44. See Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative 
Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality,» Rights 
and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 634-38 (1999). 
45. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Segal, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power: Policentric Intrerpretation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). 
46. See MARK V. TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS 26-30 (1999). 
47. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4,129-30, 145 (2001). 
48. See, e.g., Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A 
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 596 (1966) (arguing that the political 
question doctrine, "while perhaps not unimportant, is quite limited in its scope 
of actual and potential relevance" and "has not been permitted to gain a 
permanent foothold at the core of the Court's constitutional responsibility for 
the protection of individual rights and for the determination of conflicts of 
competence.") 
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do not want to overstate this point. At least in theory, it is 
possible to formulate a version of the interpretive authority theory 
that is independent of the other two. In practice, however, the 
tendency toward slippage is very strong and not often resisted. 
We can see the difficulty by reexamining the Ely and Choper 
arguments. Consider, first, Ely's views. I have expressed those 
views in the language of interpretive authority, but I doubt that 
he, himself, would have used this language. Instead of a theory for 
how authority to interpret the Constitution should be allocated, 
Ely offered his own substantive interpretation. 
Ely argued that the great, sweeping, and ambiguous clauses 
of the Constitution should be read against the backdrop of an 
overall commitment to democratic political processes.49 It followed 
from this reading that, as a substantive matter, the Constitution 
has usually not been violated in the absence of a process defect. 
Put differently, even if the courts have final authority concerning 
constitutional interpretation, Ely argued that the courts should 
interpret the Constitution as granting substantive discretion to 
the political branches in the absence of a process defect. This 
position is subtly different from the interpretive authority 
position, which grants political institutions final authority to 
interpret the Constitution, even if they interpret it incorrectly. 
If my reading of Ely's position is correct, then the political 
question problem is relevant to his theory only in its "faux" form. 
True, the theory leaves broad swaths of political action 
unamenable to judicial review, but this is so only because, as a 
substantive matter, these political actions do not violate the 
Constitution as properly understood (i.e., as concerned primarily 
with process defects). 
Of course, the fact that Ely's views do not rest upon an 
interpretive authority analysis does not prove that such an 
analysis is impossible. However, it turns out to be quite difficult 
to articulate any version of the interpretive authority theory that 
does not end up looking a lot like Ely's position. 
In order to avoid slipping into an Ely-like substantive 
interpretation of the Constitution, interpretive theorists must be 
agnostic about what the Constitution actually requires. Their 
point is that-whatever the Constitution "actually" requires-the 
political branches should sometimes have final authority to "say" 
what it requires. But is there any practical difference between the 
Constitution's meaning, and the meaning given to it by an 
authoritative interpreter? Interpretive theorists risk falling into 
what Daryl Levinson has aptly called "rights essentialism."50 
49. See ELY, supra note 36, at 11-31. 
50. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
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Rights essentialists ask us to envision rights that exists in an 
abstract, Platonic sphere that is wholly disconnected from any 
actual remedy that might make a difference in the real world. AB I 
understand Ely's position, he is not a rights essentialist because 
the substantive rights he defines, although limited, are judicially 
enforceable. On the other hand, interpretive authority theorists 
tend toward rights essentialism because under their theory, rights 
are taken to exist even though they make no difference in the 
outcome of real law suits. 
Recall that the political question doctrine does work only 
when, but for the doctrine, the losing party in a law suit would 
have been victorious. Thus, a judge relying on the political 
question doctrine must start by asserting that a right has been 
violated. But it is precisely in the cases where the political 
question doctrine makes a difference that the judge must also 
deprive the right of efficacy. Put differently, giving the political 
question doctrine work to do always means frustrating the work 
that rights would otherwise do. And if rights do no work, one 
might fairly ask, what is their point?51 
Of course, the fact that the rights are not judicially 
enforceable does not mean that they are not enforceable at all. 
Judicially unenforceable rights can have real world consequences 
if enforced by the political branches. Indeed, scholars who have 
defended broad interpretive authority for Congress and the 
President rely on just this point.52 Their claim is that Congress 
and the President will provide better protection for these rights 
than courts would. 53 
Unfortunately, however, this assertion, even if true, does not 
overcome the rights essentialism objection. The political question 
doctrine is a judicial creation, and we must therefore evaluate its 
coherence from the perspective of the judges who created it. The 
doctrine does work only when, from the perspective of these judges, 
rights go unenforced. Hence, a judge who fails to reach the merits 
because of the political question doctrine must believe that there 
are rights "out there" that retain their status despite the absence 
of any real world consequences attached to those rights.54 Many 
51. See Wayne McCormack, The Political Question Doctrine-
Jurisprudentially, 70 DET. MERCY L. REV. 793,808 (1993) (arguing that "lilt is 
the lack of effect on institutionally recognized relationships that makes the 
political question provision nonlaw, and it is in that sense that ... the courts 
hold a provision to be nonlaw when they say that it gives rise to a political 
question. ") 
52. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 46, at 170-77. 
53. I discuss the interpretive authority position from the perspective of 
these scholars below. 
54. Perhaps real world consequences do attach to judicial declarations of 
rights, even when judges do not enforce them, because the political branches 
will be influenced by the "advise" provided by judges. My colleague Neal 
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people will find this view deeply implausible. 55 They will ask what, 
precisely, is the difference between a world where rights go 
unenforced and world where there are no rights. If one thinks 
that there is no difference, then one will also tend to think that 
there is no difference between a loss suffered because of the 
political question doctrine and a loss suffered on the merits. The 
interpretive authority theory thus collapses back into faux 
political question fallacy. 
In order to avoid (or at least mitigate) this problem, most 
interpretive authority theorists are prepared to recognize 
judicially enforceable boundaries that limit the interpretive 
authority of the political branches. Precisely because granting 
unbounded interpretive authority to Congress would, effectively, 
eliminate rights that amounted to anything, these theorists want 
to reduce the sphere within which interpretive authority can be 
exercised. 
These boundaries might be either textual or catagorical. 
Katzenbach v. McClung illustrates the use of textual boundaries. 
Recall that in McClung, the Court was prepared to grant Congress 
interpretive authority over the phrase "[t]o regulate Commerce ... 
among the several States,"56 but only so long as its application of 
the clause was "rational." Moreover, the Court made clear that it 
had final authority to determine what counted as "rational." 
Textual boundaries do not render the interpretive authority 
position altogether meaningless, but they do render it much less 
significant. Consider again the Nixon case. We have seen that the 
Court's actual holding that the impeachment clause granted 
Congress discretion to choose the method by which Judge Nixon 
was "tried"-collapses the distinction between application of the 
political question doctrine and the merits. 
How would the interpretive authority version of the doctrine 
Katyal has explored this possibility in great depth and with great 
sophistication. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advisegivers, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1709 (1998). Still, I am doubtful that political question judgments often 
influence political actors to enforce judicially unenforced rights. First, courts 
that fail to reach the merits because of the political question doctrine rarely 
give advise. The more usual practice is simply to hold that the case is 
nonjusticiable without indicating what the court would do if it were able to 
reach the merits. Second, a court that holds that another branch has final 
interpretive authority over the matter is saying, in effect, that our system 
prefers a judgment of that other branch to a judicial judgment. This sort of 
institutional modesty is not well calculated to cause members of a political 
branch to doubt their own initial judgment about the matter. 
55. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall himself thought it was deeply 
implausible. He wrote that "The government of the United States has been 
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly 
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the 
violation ofa vested legal right." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. 
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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differ from this holding? A court following the interpretive 
authority theory would say that the impeachment clause grants to 
Congress final authority to interpret the word "try" even if its 
interpretation differs from the Court's reading of the same word. 
However, the scope of this permissible interpretation is not 
unbounded. Following McClung, we might say, for example, that 
the interpretation must be "rational" and that the Court will have 
the final "say" as to whether the interpretation adopted by 
Congress is rational or not. Presumably, a "rational" 
interpretation is one that the word will fairly bear. But if the 
word "try" is open-textured enough to "rationally" include what 
Congress did, it would seem to follow that Congress has, once 
again, not exceeded the textual limits of the impeachment clause. 
The framers' choice of an open textured word rationally subject to 
different interpretations in effect granted substantive discretion to 
the political branches to adopt a variety of different procedures so 
long as the procedures were within the open texture. But if this is 
true, the interpretive authority theory, like the faux theory, yet 
again collapses back into the merits.57 
The categorical approach avoids this difficulty by ceding to 
the political branches substantive categories of interpretive 
authority.58 For example, it is widely supposed that Congress 
alone has the authority to decide what counts as the "Republican 
form of Government"59 guaranteed by Article IV.60 There is 
substantial support for the position that questions relating to 
57. The point holds true even if a word is so open-textured that, as a 
practical matter, the political branches have complete discretion. For 
example, Professor Pushaw argues that with regard to certain powers (he lists 
the veto, impeachment, appointments, and military and foreign policy 
decisions), the people have "entrusted their federal government 
representatives with complete latitude" and therefore "by definition the 
exercise of such discretion cannot violate the Constitution." Robert J. Pushaw, 
Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the 
Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1196-97 
(2002). Pushaw argues that these areas are appropriate for invocation of the 
political question doctrine. [d. It should be clear, however, that if we start 
from Pushaw's premise that the Constitution has not been (indeed cannot be) 
violated with respect to these powers, the political question doctrine is, once 
again, doing no work. One might, of course, quarrel with that premise. But 
we should understand the nature of the quarrel. It is an argument about 
substantive constitutional interpretation, not about application of the political 
question doctrine. 
58. See, e.g., id. (arguing in favor of a "Hamiltonian" approach that creates 
a presumption that courts have final interpretive authority, but provides that 
the presumption can be rebutted with respect to some particular 
constitutional provisions). 
59. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Taylor 
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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foreign affairs are politica1.61 For a period, it was thought that 
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment's protection of state 
sovereignty was the sole responsibility ofthe political branches.62 
The categorical approach holds that courts have no business 
deciding whether the political branches act "rationally" when they 
interpret relevant constitutional language within these categories 
of cases. Instead, the categories are wholly within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Congress and the President. Thus, on a categorical 
approach, the Court might have held that even if Congress had 
irrationally interpreted the word "try," the Court should 
nonetheless stay its hand because the entire subject of 
impeachment is within Congress' interpretive domain. 
There is not an inherent logical fallacy with this approach, 
but it nonetheless poses two significant difficulties. First, if 
interpretive authority is not to be completely unbounded, the 
Court still must have final authority to decide whether the 
political branches are acting within an appropriate category.63 
This decision, in turn, involves a question of constitutional 
interpretation64 -a fact that reintroduces textual analysis through 
the back door.6s Suppose, for example, that the stated ground for 
impeaching a federal judge was that he was an African American. 
Does this sort of "impeachment" fall within the boundaries of an 
immune category? If the definition of the category is, itself, a 
matter of constitutional interpretation, then one would suppose 
that the Court must bring to bear constitutional provisions 
relating to race discrimination when defining the category. And 
61. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211 (1962); Oetjen v. 
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 269, 302 (1918). 
62. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
But cf New York v. United States, 505 U.s. 144 (1992); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
63. Thus, as Herbert Wechsler has written: 
[Tlhe only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision 
is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to 
another agency of government than the courts. Difficult as it may be to 
make the judgment wisely, whatever factors may be rightly weighed in 
situations where the answer is not clear, what is involved is in itself an 
act of constitutional interpretation, to be made and judged by standards 
that should govern the interpretive process generally. 
Wechsler, supra note 16, at 9. 
64. As the Court said in Baker: 
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of 
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a 
delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility 
ofthis Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. 
369 U.S. at 211. 
65. Martin Redish has made a similar point. See Redish, supra note 9, at 
1041. 
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once it does that, it will be obvious to the Court that this sort of 
"impeachment" is not within the constitutionally delineated 
boundaries. 
My hypothetical example provides a relatively easy case, but 
the Court has actually decided a harder one. In Powell v. 
McCormack,66 the House of Representatives, purporting to utilize 
its Article II power to "be the judge of the ... Qualifications of its 
own Members,,,s7 refused to permit Congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell to take his seat. If one took the categorical approach to 
interpretive authority seriously, one might suppose that this 
would be the end of the matter. Yet despite explicit language in 
Article II that seems to vest interpretive authority in Congress, 
the Court nonetheless held that it could adjudicate Powell's claim. 
On the Court's view, in order to determine whether Congress was 
exercising its exclusive authority, the Court had to interpret the 
word "Qualifications." This word, the Court said, included only 
the age, citizenship, and residence requirements of Article 1.68 
Since Powell obviously satisfied these requirements, it followed 
that Congress must have been doing something other than judging 
his "Qualifications" when it refused to seat him. Therefore, 
Congress was acting outside the category of cases over which it 
had interpretive authority, and Powell's claim was justiciable.69 
I do not mean to suggest that as a matter of pure logic, Powell 
had to be decided in the way that it was. Still, it is easy to see why 
the Court wanted to reach the merits of his claim. To make the 
point more explicit, suppose that Congress had made a clearly 
irrational or disingenuous judgment about Powell's qualifications, 
concluding, for example, that a few weekends spent in Bimini 
meant that he was not a "resident" of New York. A Court could 
hold that this finding was nonjusticiable simply because Congress 
claimed that it was acting within the category of "qualifications." 
However, it will inevitably seem to the Court that, whatever it 
claimed, Congress was not in fact adjudicating the question vested 
in it by the Constitution. Confronted with this problem, the Court 
will be under pressure to find that Congress has not acted within 
the scope of its interpretive authority and, so, to decide the merits. 
The second problem arises when one attempts to avoid this 
difficulty by adopting non textual , functional grounds for 
delineating spheres of interpretive authority. This is the project of 
Choper's book. For Choper, the political branches should be ceded 
interpretive authority over federalism and separation of powers 
claims, while the courts should retain interpretive authority over 
66. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5, cl. 1. 
68. Powell, 395 U.S. at 522. 
69. [d. at 548-49. 
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civil liberties claims.70 Choper does not rely upon textual 
provisions, like the "Qualifications" Clause of Article I to reach 
this conclusion. Instead, he adopts a functional approach. 
Following Herbert Wechsler,71 he argues that there are "built-in" 
political guarantees for federalism and separation of powers 
principles that make judicial intervention unnecessary. In 
contrast, the political branches cannot be trusted to protect 
minority rights, so judicial intervention is necessary within this 
sphere.72 
Whereas Ely's position folds interpretive authority back into 
"faux" political questions, Choper's tends toward conflation of the 
interpretive authority and "secret" versions of the doctrine. The 
problem for Choper is to defend the criteria for determining 
whether the political and judicial branches achieve the "right" 
level of protection for the various principles at stake. For the most 
part, Choper's book simply avoids this problem. To be sure, he 
produces a rich variety of empirical data showing the varying 
extent to which the political branches protect federalism, 
separation of powers, and individual rights values.73 But empirical 
data famously fail to answer normative questions. Choper 
therefore simply assumes, without much discussion, that the 
reader will agree with him that the political protections for 
federalism and separation of powers somehow yield the "right" 
balance, whereas those for civil liberties do not. 74 
70. See CHOPER, supra note 36, at 65,67-68, 175,263. 
71. See Herbert Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
72. See CHOPER, supra note 36, at 65,68-70,79-80,202-03,275,314. 
73. See id. at 68, 185-88, 238-39, 282-95. 
74. For example, Choper asserts that "the experience of history strongly 
suggests that vesting the majority with the ultimate power of judgment, 
although far from being calamitous, would not sufficiently protect minority 
rights." Id. at 65. In support of this proposition, Choper cites our experience 
with slavery, public assistance to church-related schools, internal security, 
and the socioeconomic rights of racial minorities. [d. at 68. We can put to one 
side the issue of slavery, where, to say the least, there is no evidence that the 
courts performed any better than majoritarian institutions. Choper's other 
examples have force only if one agrees with him on the merits of these 
disputes. But not everyone does agree. Unfortunately, Choper's book provides 
no argument supporting his side of the dispute. 
Similarly, Choper argues that judicial review of the Constitution's 
federalism provisions is unnecessary because "the proliferation of national 
programs has neither led to a centralized autocracy nor resulted in the total 
concentration of federal power to the exclusion of the individual states." [d. at 
186. Here, Choper's rhetoric unfairly prejudices the argument by excluding 
middle cases. To be sure, if one emphasizes the words "autocracy" and "total" 
his conclusion is uncontroversial. But one might similarly say that the 
absence of judicial review of civil liberties claims would not lead to death 
camps and the gulag. In the civil liberties context, Choper understands that 
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How does Choper know that this is true? Importantly, the 
criteria for "rightness" cannot be grounded in the Constitution 
itself. By hypothesis, the judiciary and the political branches 
disagree about what the Constitution requires. For Choper to take 
sides in this dispute would be for him to decide the merits-the 
very thing that the political question doctrine is supposed to avoid. 
If the point of Choper's exercise is to devise legal rules that 
produce constitutionally mandated outcomes, he could do so 
directly by simply telling us what the Constitution mandates. It 
follows, I think, that Choper's criteria must be extraconstitutional. 
Choper has an unarticulated and undefended political position 
(which he expects the reader to share) that is best achieved by 
manipulating the jurisdictional responsibilities of the various 
political branches. Put differently, Choper's political question 
doctrine leads a secret life. Under the cover of doctrinal 
respectability, his political question doctrine subverts the core 
assumptions of constitutionalism by deciding the very political 
questions it purports to avoid. 
C. Secret Political Questions 
Choper is not alone in wrestling with a secret political 
question doctrine. The most famous chronicler of secret political 
questions was Alexander Bickel. In order to understand both the 
great strengths and important weaknesses of Bickel's insights, 
they must be historically and politically located. 
Published more than a decade before the work of Ely, Choper, 
and Henkin, Bickel's best known book,75 was preoccupied with the 
crisis in judicial legitimacy produced by Brown v. Board of 
Education.76 In Bickel's world, the Warren Court had not yet 
achieved iconic status and the outcome of its dramatic 
intervention in race relations remained very much in doubt. 
"Massive resistance" was still at its height, the President was not 
yet firmly committed to a civil rights agenda, and Congress was 
dominated by southern segregationists. 
Faced with uncertain and wavering political support, the 
Supreme Court charted a cautious path. Whereas the Brown I 
opinion was marked by sweeping and powerful rhetoric, Brown II77 
suggested pragmatism and willingness to compromise. Between 
Brown II and the publication of Bickel's book in 1962, the Court 
avoiding these extreme outcomes is not good enough. He fails to understand 
that even if judicial abstention from federalism claims would not lead to 
autocracy or total concentration of power, but it might nonetheless produce 
undesirable or unconstitutional centralization. Once again, Choper's book 
provides no argument refuting this position. 
75. BICKEL, supra note 9. 
76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
77. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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had remained almost entirely silent, seemingly avoiding the 
conflict that its own opinion had sparked.78 Indeed, in Nairn v. 
Nairn,79 a case decided shortly after Brown, the Court went to 
embarrassing lengths to avoid striking down a blatantly racist 
antimiscegenation statute when doing so would have upset white 
southern sensibilities.80 To many contemporary observers, the 
result in Nairn seemed completely lawless and impossible to 
justify on the basis ofprinciple.81 
The Court's behavior during this period produced an 
intellectual crisis among the liberal legal intelligentsia, still 
struggling with the legacy of Lochner and its repudiation. In the 
immediate wake of Brown, Judge Learned Hand had reopened the 
old question about whether any form of judicial review was 
legitimate.82 In a famous response, Herbert Wechsler defended 
judicial review, but only so long as it was "principled."83 At the 
conclusion of his essay, he raised serious doubts about whether 
Brown could be defended on a principled basis.84 
As a young legal academic, Bickel was doubtless caught up in 
the intellectual doubts raised by Hand and Wechsler. But he had 
also clerked for Justice Frankfurter while Brown was being 
considered and believed that the case had been decided correctly.85 
78. After issuing a series of per curiam opinions, extending Brown to state 
mandated segregation in fields other than education, see Gayle v. Browder, 
352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor of 
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), the Court intervened only once, 
responding to outright and very public defiance by Governor Orval Faubus of 
Arkansas. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
79. 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (vacating and remanding judgment below), appeal 
dismissed 350 U.S. 985 (1956). 
80. In a memorandum to his fellow justices concerning Naim, Justice 
Frankfurter, for whom Bickel clerked, made clear his view that the "moral 
considerations" far outweighed the "technical considerations" in disposing of 
the case. The "moral" considerations 
are, of course, those raised by the bearing of adjudicating this question 
to the Court's responsibility in not thwarting or seriously handicapping 
the enforcement of its decision in the segregation cases. . .. For I find it 
difficult to believe that there is a single member of this Court who does 
not think that to throw a decision of this Court other than validating 
this legislation into the vortex of the present disquietude would not 
seriously, I believe very seriously embarrass the carrying out of the 
Court's decree oflast May. 
The memorandum is reproduced in Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and 
Desegregation: Decision Making in the Supreme Court 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 
1, 96-97 (1979). 
81. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 16, at 34. 
82. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15-18 (1958). 
83. See Wechsler, supra note 16, at 15. 
84. Id. at 33-34. 
85. For an account of Bickel's role in the Brown deliberations, see MARK V. 
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARsHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 1936-1961, at 203 (1994). 
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The project of Bickel's book, then, was to take into account the 
arguments that Hand and Wechsler had made, while also 
defending the Court's Brown and post-Brown stance. 
Accomplishing this task required a subtle and complex 
dialectical argument. On the one hand, judicial review in general 
and Brown in particular was defensible on the ground that the 
Court could appropriately protect enduring principles against 
temporary majoritarian pressure.86 On the other hand, no society 
could survive on an exclusive diet of rigid adherence to 
unwavering principle.87 It followed that the Court could maintain 
its principled stance only by unprincipled restrictions on the 
occasions for declarations of principle. Relying on the much older 
progressive tradition associated with Brandeis, Thayer, and his 
own mentor, Frankfurter, Bickel saw the Court's willingness to 
stay its hand as an important precondition to its legitimacy when 
it chose to act. It was crucial for the Court to act in principled 
fashion as, pace Wechsler, it surely had acted in Brown. But in 
the real world, the Court could only maintain this principled 
stance if it paid some attention to politics when it decided whether 
to decide.88 Hence, Brown I, Brown II and Nairn had all been 
rightly decided.89 
Bickel's argument had two important corollaries with regard 
to the political question doctrine. First, it meant that his version 
of the doctrine, unlike the versions considered so far, had real bite. 
For Bickel, application of the doctrine involved far more than the 
mere recognition that the political branches had acted within the 
discretion the Constitution granted to them. Bickel's version 
simply resists being domesticated in this fashion. There is ... 
something different about it, in kind not in degree; something 
greatly more flexible, something of prudence, not construction and 
not principle. And it is something that cannot exist within the four 
comers of Marbury u. Madison. 90 
There is, then, nothing "faux" about this political question 
doctrine. In the struggle between principle and expedience, the 
doctrine is the mechanism by which courts give expedience its due. 
The doctrine reflects a profoundly subversive judicial judgment 
that constitutional adjudication has its limits. Bickel's crucial 
insight, never fully articulated, is that constitutional law cannot 
be self-validating. Judges must inevitably make judgments about 
whether to apply constitutional law. There will therefore be some 
86. See BICKEL, supra note 9, at 24-28. 
87. See id. at 64. 
88. See id. at 70. 
89. For Bickel's awkward effort to defend both Brown l, as principled, and 
Brown II, as expedient, see id. at 244-255. For his defense of Naim, see id. at 
174. 
90. ld. at 125-26. 
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cases in which the Court simply should not obey constitutional 
commands and in these cases, there will be a real gap between the 
constitutional merits and the result the Court actually reaches. 
Had Bickel's analysis stopped there, his work would have 
been truly radical. However, he attempted to cut off the most 
destabilizing aspects of his claim with a second corollary that 
sharply limited the force of the first. Although muscular and 
meaningful, Bickel's political question doctrine was nonetheless a 
"passive virtue."91 It provided arguments for not acting; not a 
reason for action. Bickel argued for this distinction on the ground 
that only by not deciding some things could the Court protect the 
legal purity of the things it chose to decide. Thus, 
[T]he techniques and allied devices for staying the Court's hand ... 
cannot themselves be principled in the sense in which we have a 
right to expect adjudications on the merits to be principled. They 
mark the point at which the Court gives the electoral institutions 
their head and itself stays out of politics, and there is nothing 
paradoxical in finding that here is where the Court is a most 
political animal. 92 
Nothing paradoxical? The real drama in Bickel's book 
revolves around his ultimately futile effort to persuade us that this 
seeming paradox can be resolved. The book's failure is perfectly 
captured by Gerald Gunther's devastating taunt that Bickel 
insisted on one hundred percent devotion to principle twenty 
percent of the time.93 As Gunther powerfully demonstrated, it was 
difficult to see how the Court could maintain either its reputation 
for or the reality of apolitical neutrality by engaging in conduct 
that was concededly political. The political question doctrine could 
hardly keep the Court out of politics if application of the doctrine, 
itself, required political judgments. 
Gunther's critique leads to the disquieting conclusion that if 
the passive virtues are to serve their intended function, they can 
do so only by misleading the country. Bickel must have assumed 
that the Court could maintain its reputation for apolitical, 
principled adjudication while still acting politically because the 
country paid more attention to what the Court decided than to 
what it chose not to decide. But not doing is, after all, also a kind 
of doing;94 for the parties involved in Nairn, the Court's 
91. [d. at 200. 
92. [d. at 132. 
93. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 
1,3(1964). 
94. Indeed, as Professor Scharpf pointed out, a political question 
determination, unlike other techniques of avoidance such as ripeness, 
mootness, or standing has an impact far broader than its effect on the 
immediate parties. When a court uses other avoidance techniques, it holds 
HeinOnline -- 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 463 2003-2004
2004) The Political Question Doctrine 463 
disingenuous avoidance of the merits had precisely the same 
impact as a decision upholding the statute.95 If the two results 
differed at all, the difference lay in how the alternative 
dispositions were (or would have been) perceived. A decision 
upholding the Virginia antimiscegination statute would 
"legitimate" naked racism, whereas a "nondecision," somehow 
getting rid of the case on unprincipled grounds, would noe6 But 
this difference, if indeed it exists at all, crucially depends upon the 
public's failure to understand the actual consequences of what the 
Court has done or failed to do. The Court was, in effect, betting on 
Brown creating banner headlines, while Naim slipped unreported 
through the news sieve. 
Bickel's struggle with the issue of judicial candor is painful 
and contradictory. In a section of the book discussing Justice 
Hugo Black's absolutist views of constitutional interpretation, he 
addresses the possibility that Black might have overstated his 
position in order to protect the "right" level of principle from 
political erosion. If Black is, indeed, creating "an illusion, 
purposefully fostered,"97 Bickel is strongly censorious. 
To introduce into judicial review the factor of attitude springing 
from illusion would be gravely to depreciate and damage the 
process. The process is justified only if it is as deliberate and 
conscious as men can make it .... [T]he Court should not tell itself 
or the world that it draws decisions from a text that is incapable of 
yielding them. That obscures the actual process of decision, for the 
country, and for the judges themselves, if they fall in with the 
illusion. And it is a menace, to the Court and to the country .... 98 
Yet the purity that Bickel sought can be maintained only 
through the very dissembling that Bickel condemned. The Court 
could afford to stand on principle in Brown only because it 
deliberately and self-consciously obscured reality in Naim. 
This contradiction, in turn, raises intriguing questions about 
Bickel's own candor. Perhaps it is true that the Court can better 
hide its politics when it refuses to decide than when it decides. 
open the possibility that the claim might be adjudicated by different parties 
suing at a different time. In contrast, a political question determination 
permanently insulates an area from legal challenge. See Fritz W. Scharpf, 
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE 
L.J. 517, 537 (1966). 
95. Cf. Graham Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political Question 
Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1968) (arguing that a court decision that it 
has no power to make a determination "is tantamount to a finding that there 
is a legal liberty for the legislature or executive to perform the challenged 
act"). 
96. See BICKEL, supra note 9, at 69-70. For Gunther's criticism of this 
position, see Gunther, supra note 93, at 6-8. 
97. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 96. 
98. [d. at 96-97. 
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There may nonetheless be occasions when it can hide its politics 
well enough even when it decides.99 If political necessity is 
powerful enough, should the Court, on these occasions, abandon 
its devotion to principle when it acts as well as when it fails to 
act?IOO One thing is certain: if Bickel thought that it should, he 
would never have told us so. For if, indeed, the Court's politics 
must remain secret, then it would hardly do for the Court's 
defenders to reveal the secret. 
These observations are, of course speculative, but the 
speculation is not altogether groundless. Recall that Bickel 
defended Brown as an example of principled adjudication. So, of 
course, did all nine Justices of the Supreme Court. Yet we now 
know from examination of the Justices' (then) secret conference 
notes that several of the Justices, including Bickel's employer at 
the time (none other than Felix Frankfurter), voted for Brown 
despite extremely serious reservations about the legal justification 
for the opinion. l01 Could Bickel have shared these doubts?102 If so, 
. he could hardly have publicly acknowledged as much. Honesty 
about the need for dishonesty is, of course, contradictory, but in 
the context in which Bickel wrote, contradiction was the least of it. 
With the Supreme Court under attack by bigots and reactionaries, 
with racial justice on the line, and with the political and moral 
imperatives as strong as they have been at any time in the Court's 
history, candor would have amounted to self-indulgent moral 
cowardice. In the face of all this, could it be that Alexander Bickel 
99. Moreover, as Martin Redish points out, the Court sometimes courts 
political backlash by refusing to decide, rather than by deciding. See Redish, 
supra note 9, at 1059. (noting that the Court may have expended political 
capital because of its refusal to decide federalism issues). 
100. Even if one applies the criteria traditionally associated with the 
political question doctrine, action may sometimes be more defensible than 
inaction. Consider, for example, the problem of embarrassment of the United 
States in its relationships with other governments. As Fritz Scharpf points 
out, there may be occasions when "the State Department may be much more 
embarrassed by the necessity to take a stand on questions of this nature than 
by the need to explain the decisions of American courts to a foreign 
government." Scharpf, supra note 94, at 582. 
101. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 303-04 (2004); 
TuSHNET, supra note 85, at 188-210. 
102. A memorandum Bickel wrote for Frankfurter's benefit, later converted 
into a law review article, strongly suggests that Bickel entertained doubts as 
to whether conventional legal materials supported Brown. Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. 
REV. 1, 61 (1955). The article ultimately defends Brown, but concludes 
somewhat lamely that the equal protection clause allowed moderates and 
radicals both "to go to the country with language which they could, where 
necessary, defend against damaging alarms raised by the opposition, but 
which at the same time was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future 
advances." [d. 
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was too principled to stand on principle? 
II. DOCTRINE AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION "DOCTRINE" 
A. Normalizing Secret Political Questions 
We can never know whether Bickel secretly favored the 
Court's secret politics. What is certain, though, is that the secret 
political question doctrine played, and continues to play, a vital 
role in the Court's affairs. Nor is the doctrine merely a "passive 
virtue." On a regular basis, the Court makes political judgments 
about the applicability of the Constitution, both when it declines to 
decide cases and when it decides them.l03 
On some level, this fact should hardly surprise us. It 
amounts to no more than a logical truth that a normative system 
cannot establish its own normative worthiness. Admit it or not, 
every Justice in every case faces a logically antecedent question 
before she interprets the Constitution: should I do what the 
Constitution commands? Two things are plain: first, the 
Constitution itself cannot answer this question. Second, there will 
be occasions when the right answer is "no." 
These propositions may seem shocking or extreme, yet they 
are so conventional that we hardly notice the occasions when they 
guide behavior. Indeed, for reasons I will explain below, they 
serve their purpose only because we do not notice. In this sense, 
the recent occasion when the country did notice is aberrational. 
Many Americans believe that Bush v. GorelO4 was resolved on the 
basis of political, rather than legal imperatives. On the least 
charitable view, the Court was determined to enforce its own 
version of the "Republican form of government clause," as the (now 
tired) joke goes. Richard Posner has advanced a much more 
charitable view. He argues that the case was rightly decided, not 
because the law somehow required this result but because the 
Court's decision saved us from a nontrivial possibility of disabling 
deadlock. 105 
There are good reasons to doubt that Posner is right about the 
prospects of deadlock and room for reasonable disagreement about 
whether even real prospects of deadlock were sufficient reason to 
justify deviation from law. Still, whatever the merits of Bush 
103. In this sense, although Gunther's criticism of Bickel hit the mark, 
Gunther misunderstood the implications of the criticism-at least by my 
lights. Gunther was right to assert that there was no rlistinction between 
political (as opposed to legal) action and inaction. See Gunther, supra note 93. 
Gunther argued that the Court therefore should follow legal principles both 
when it acted and when it failed to act. [d. In contrast, my argument is that 
the Court cannot avoid political judgments in both situations. 
104. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
105. POSNER, supra note 13, 134-45, 186, 188. 
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itself, it seems indisputable that occasions will arise when the 
claims of law are outweighed by other moral or political 
imperatives. Legal scholars who have complained about the Bush 
Court's putative failure to invoke the political question doctrine106 
have therefore missed the real heart of the dispute about the case. 
If it was, indeed, wrongly decided, the Court's error lay in too 
ready a resort to the political question doctrine, rather than in 
failure to make use of it. 
Bush created a tremendous controversy, but, as noted above, 
the more conventional uses of the doctrine go largely unnoticed. I 
outline here three examples of the Court's regular reliance on 
political criteria to decide whether to obey the Constitution. 
1. Stare Decisis 
The connection between political questions and stare decisis 
may not be immediately apparent, but it is real nonetheless. 
When the Court follows prior precedent in a constitutional case, it 
is, in effect, saying that political judgments should overcome the 
requirements of constitutional law. 
To see the point, consider Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 107 perhaps the Court's most 
famous decision defending stare decisis. Much to the surprise of 
many legal commentators, the Casey Court declined to overrule 
Roe v. Wade. In its extended and extraordinary discussion of its 
reasons for this conclusion, the controlling opinion elaborated on a 
set of criteria for determining whether to abide by a former 
decision. The Justices emphasized factors like whether there had 
been reliance on the prior decision, whether it had been overtaken 
by later factual developments, and whether later doctrinal 
developments made the earlier decision anomalous. 108 
Significantly, the Court made no effort to tie these criteria to 
constitutional law. Instead, they appear to be judge-made, 
extraconstitutional norms. 
Moreover, at least one of the norms was overtly political in a 
way that Alexander Bickel would have understood. On the view of 
the justices signing the controlling opinion, it is essential that the 
Court act to preserve its own reputation for legitimacy. This 
reputation is crucially dependent on the country's perception that 
it 'is not vulnerable to political pressure. Hence, when the Court is 
under political attack, it must stand its ground. Paradoxically, the 
appearance of staunch and apolitical resistence to political 
pressure is, itself, a political imperative. 109 In Casey, the Court 
106. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
107. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
108. [d. at 854-55. 
109. [d. at 867-68. 
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held, in effect, that this political imperative was strong enough to 
tolerate violation of the Constitution. 
Of course, the controlling opinion did not say directly that it 
was departing from constitutional norms. Indeed, a section of the 
opinion introduced a new defense of the abortion right. 110 
Nonetheless, there must have been some reason why the 
discussion of stare decisis occupied so much space in the 
controlling opinion. Reliance on stare decisis is necessary only in 
cases where but for the doctrine, the Court would have followed a 
different course. It follows that whenever stare decisis makes a 
difference, the Court is disobeying a constitutional command as 
the justices then understand that command.l11 Because stare 
decisis is a doctrine about constitutional disobedience, the Court 
can hardly rely upon criteria derived from the Constitution to 
govern its applicability. Instead, the application vel non of stare 
decisis is a political question 
Some critics of stare decisis have concluded that the doctrine 
is therefore illegitimate.112 Of course, these critics are right if 
criteria for legitimacy can be derived only from the Constitution 
itself. But why should anyone believe this? Surely, there are at 
least some occasions when the imperatives of consistency, settled 
expectations, legitimacy, or simply efficiency justify not revisiting 
questions that have long been settled. At least this is what 
virtually every Justice who has served on the Court has believed. 
So far as we know, these Justices have been able to sleep quite 
well at night (thank you) despite their regular defiance of their 
constitutional obligations. 
2. Constitutional Remedy 
Like stare decisis, the law of constitutional remedy lies 
outside the bounds of constitutionalism. In Bickel's generation, 
this point became obvious when the Court turned from the 
110. [d. at 852 (arguing that abortion protected because pregnant woman's 
"suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, 
upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has 
been in the course of our history and our culture"). 
111. For just this reason, stare decisis plays no role in the civil law tradition. 
For civilians, respect for precedent is inconsistent with the primacy of the 
Code and, therefore, with the rule of law. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE 
CIVIL LAw TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF 
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing rejection 
of stare decisis in civil law systems). See also Mitchel de s.-o.-rE. Lasser, 
Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 
YALE L.J. 1325, 1335-37 (1995) (discussing "official" French position that 
judges are prohibited from establishing any rule capable of application in a 
later case). 
112. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case against Precedent, 17 
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 23 (1994). 
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substantive requirement of desegregation in Brown I to the issue 
of remedy in Brown II. As Bickel acknowledged, when the Court 
turned to remedy, the issues became practical and political rather 
than principled and constitutional. 
In our own time, the controversy over the fourth amendment 
exclusionary rule best demonstrates the necessarily 
nonconstitutional status of remedial doctrine. In recent years, the 
Court has settled upon a deterrence-based justification for the 
rule. On this theory, use of improperly obtained evidence is not, 
itself, an "unreasonable search or seizure" that violates the fourth 
amendment. Rather, the exclusionary rule is constitutionally 
compelled in order to deter future violations. 113 
The Court has regularly used this deterrence-based 
framework to balance the deterrent efficacy of the rule in various 
settings against its law enforcement cost, and when it has found 
that the latter outweighed the former, it has declined to extend the 
rule. 114 In the opinion of the Court's many critics, this balancing is 
deeply unprincipled because it presupposes an undefended value 
that is attached to each side of the balance. 115 
What the critics have failed to notice is that this valuing 
cannot possibly be accomplished within the four corners of 
constitutionalism. The problem becomes apparent as soon as one 
acknowledges that no sensible legal system would attempt to 
reduce the level of fourth amendment violations to zero. A policy, 
seriously pursued, that attempted this course would require the 
subordination of all extraconstitutional values to the prevention of 
fourth amendment violations. In such a world, the exclusionary 
rule would be the least of it; offending officers would be executed 
or jailed for life. 
There must, therefore, be an optimal level of fourth 
amendment violation. But what level? Plainly, we cannot look to 
the Constitution itself to determine the appropriate level of 
constitutional violation. It follows that judges must create fourth 
amendment remedies according to criteria that are 
nonconstitutional. Moreover, any sensible remedy will be 
constitutionally deficient in the sense that it will tolerate the 
113. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (stating 
that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, 
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved"). 
114. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.s. 897 (1984) (declining to extend 
rule to situations where officer relies in good faith on facially valid warrant); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (declining to extend rule to habeas corpus 
proceedings); Immigration & Nat. Servo V. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 
(1984) (declining to extend the rule to deportation proceedings). 
115. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 949-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 
Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the 
Scaffold: But Was the Trial Fair?, 22 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 87-88 (1984). 
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continued existence of justified constitutional violations. The 
decision to impose one remedy rather than another is therefore 
political in the sense that it balances nonconstitutional values 
against constitutional commands and allows the former to 
outweigh the latter when it seems sensible to do so. 
3. Doctrinal Elaboration 
The prior two examples involve discrete areas of 
constitutional law. However, the point of the examples can be 
generalized. As scholars such as Richard Fallon, 116 David 
Strauss , 117 Henry Monaghan,118 and Akhil Amar119 have taught us, 
constitutional doctrine is separate from and, in an important 
sense, in tension with constitutional law. In any advanced 
constitutional system, it will not be possible to apply undiluted 
constitutional commands to cases as they arise. Instead, judges 
over time will have to gloss the naked commands with judge-made 
supplements. 
Given this fact, it is not surprising that many of the Court's 
modern constitutional decisions make no more than passing 
reference to the document itself. Instead, the U.S. Reports are 
filled with discussion of the four part Central Hudson test for 
commercial speech, the various tiers of review in equal protection 
cases, or the different variety of public fora available for political 
demonstrations. 
Without an understanding of the central role played by the 
political question doctrine, the existence of this doctrinal overlay 
can seem quite mysterious. Consider, for example, Dickerson v. 
United States/20 where the Court held unconstitutional a 
congressional attempt to overrule Miranda v. Arizona. 121 In 
numerous cases decided between Miranda and Dickerson, the 
Court had held that the Miranda warnings were not required by 
the fifth amendment, but rather were a judicially created tool 
designed to enforce the amendment. 122 In Dickerson, the 
government argued that if Miranda warnings were, indeed, not 
constitutionally required, the Constitution did not prevent 
116. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 
111 HARv. L. REV. 56, 66 (1996). 
117. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877, 894 (1996). 
118. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
119. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 
HARv. L. REV. 26 (2000). 
120. 530 U.s. 428 (2000). 
121. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
122. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.s. 433, 444 (1974); New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 539, 654 (1984); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 
(1987). 
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Congress from overriding them. The Court soundly rejected this 
claim. 
Someone who thinks that the Court's only source of authority 
comes from the Constitution will have considerable difficulty 
understanding this result. If the Constitution does not require 
Miranda warnings, and if the Court's only power derives from the 
Constitution, it would seem to follow syllogistically that the Court 
lacks the power to invalidate a statute permitting the introduction 
of confessions prohibited by Miranda. 
The result in Dickerson makes perfect sense as soon as one 
acknowledges that the Court also has authority to promulgate 
doctrine that is supplemental to and different from the commands 
of the Constitution itself. Doctrine is supplemental to the 
Constitution because, taken by themselves, the Constitution's 
commands are too porous and general to be instantiated in 
everyday life. For example, as the pre-Miranda Court discovered, 
the constitutional requirement of noncoercion is a philosophical 
abstraction that is a poor substitute for the kind of clear rule that 
lower courts and countless police officials need when they go about 
their daily work.'23 Doctrinal elaboration is necessary to mediate 
between legal abstractions on the one hand and the endless 
complexity and variety of individual cases on the other. 
However, constitutional doctrine is also different from, and 
therefore in real tension with, the Constitution. AB I have argued 
elsewhere, much of the Constitution's power derives from its 
majestic incoherence. 124 The ideals of equality, freedom, and 
dignity that the Constitution embodies are powerful precisely 
because they can never be given concrete expression. They are 
contradictory and allusive poetic evocations, not bureaucratic 
rules. When the Supreme Court converts them into the kind of 
directives necessary to run the vast bureaucracy that is the United 
States, the Justices must necessarily be concerned with 
extraconstitutional issues like administrability, coherence, and 
comprehensibili ty. 
Constitutional doctrine is therefore both more elaborate and 
less flexible than the Constitution itself. More importantly for 
present purposes, the source of constitutional doctrine cannot be 
the Constitution. This fact is a necessary consequence of the 
reasons we need doctrine in the first place. If the Constitution 
were self-implementing we would not need the doctrine; because it 
is not self-implementing, judges must look outside the 
Constitution for the tools that will implement it. 
123. For discussion of this problem, see Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and 
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 742 (1992). 
124. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW 
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 10-11 (2001). 
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B. Doctrine, Secrecy, and Choice 
The preceding section is designed to demystify an authentic 
political question doctrine by demonstrating that the Supreme 
Court, regularly and without much controversy, disregards 
constitutional requirements. A natural response to this argument 
is to point out that it is parasitic on a contestable conception of the 
boundary between constitutional law on the one hand and politics 
on the other. A less formal, more capacious definition of 
constitutional law avoids the charge that the Court regularly 
disregards this law. For example, if one defines constitutional law 
as consisting of constitutional doctrine as developed by the 
Supreme Court, or as itself requiring respect for stare decisis or an 
appropriate balance between enforcement and nonenforcement of 
fourth amendment norms, then the Court is obeying, rather than 
flouting constitutional commands. Conversely, a narrow enough 
definition of "politics" rescues the Court from the charge that it 
has confused political with constitutional judgments. For 
example, if one defines "politics" to mean the kind of partisan 
politics that elected officials regularly engage in, none of my 
examples demonstrate that the Court has made political 
judgments. 
Although there is some force to this argument, it mostly 
misses the point. My position does not depend upon the 
specification of any particular boundary between constitutional 
law and politics. Rather, it depends only on the assumption that 
some such boundary exists. If we define constitutional law to 
encompass everything that the Supreme Court does, then of course 
the Court never allows politics to intrude on its constitutional 
judgments. But a definition of constitutionalism that is this broad 
deprives the word of any useful meaning. As soon as we entertain 
the possibility that something lies outside the domain of 
constitutionalism, then it will inevitably be true that the Court 
will face a choice between doing what the Constitution commands 
and doing something else. 
For example, suppose one were to say that the Constitution 
requires a "reasonable" level of enforcement of fourth amendment 
rights. If what one means by this is simply an "all things 
considered" judgment about how much enforcement there should 
be, then of course the level of enforcement is controlled by 
constitutional law. But constitutional law defined this broadly no 
longer constitutes a useful analytic category. The Constitution 
has meaning only if, at least occasionally, it requires that we do 
something that we would not otherwise have done. And as soon ,as 
we narrow the domain of constitutional law so as to give it 
meaning, courts will be confronted with the problem of whether to 
do what the Constitution commands or what they otherwise would 
have done. For example, they will be confronted with the problem 
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of what level of fourth amendment violation is "reasonable." This 
residual category need not consist of politics in the partisan sense. 
But it is politics in the sense that the outcomes it produces cannot 
be justified within the domain of constitutionalism. However 
constitutional law is defined, it will always make sense to allow 
some violations of that law to go unremedied, and the Constitution 
cannot, without contradiction, establish when it should be 
violated. 
There is another sense, though, in which the specific 
examples I have used are within the domain of constitutionalism. 
The examples look like constitutional law because they are, 
themselves, heavily doctrinalized. It is thus easy to assimilate 
them into normal constitutionalism. In contrast, the real political 
question doctrine can never be completely normalized. This is so 
because, at bottom, the doctrine reflects the brute and frightening 
reality of unmediated and uncontrollable choice. The very act of 
bringing this choice into consciousness denies the existence of 
choice. As soon as the Justices recognize the possibility of 
unmediated freedom, they inevitably attempt to justify the path 
they have chosen. But justification implies structure and limits, 
and structure and limits are incompatible with raw freedom. 
It follows that we can never see the real political question 
doctrine at work. What we see, instead, is the indirect evidence of 
its existence, left over from the brief instant between its coming 
into consciousness and the frantic effort at control. Thus, it is no 
coincidence that the "law" of stare decisis and remedy is highly 
developed and structured and that doctrinal elaboration is just 
that-doctrine. True, we can demonstrate that attempting to root 
these phenomena in the Constitution yields logical contradiction. 
It is this contradiction that provides the indirect evidence that 
there is a real political question lurking below the surface. In 
contrast, the surface manifestations-phenomena like stare 
decisis, remedy, and doctrinal elaboration-are just more 
examples of the repression and denial that is constitutional law. 
We can nonetheless catch fleeting and indirect evidence of 
secret political questions if we focus on the evasive maneuvers 
undertaken at the moment when the possibility of true choice 
emerges. A good example is provided by a recent, provocative 
article by Oren Gross concerning the appropriate legal response to 
• 125 
emergencIes. 
Writing in the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade 
Center, Gross carefully examines, and ultimately rejects, the two 
standard responses to grave national crisis. According to the 
"Business as Usual Model," there are no special emergency 
125. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises 
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003). 
HeinOnline -- 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 473 2003-2004
2004] The Political Question Doctrine 473 
powers. Instead, on this view, the system already grants the 
government adequate powers, and any departure from regular 
legality endangers the entire constitutional structure.126 Gross 
believes that this model risks "inflexible, dogmatic utopianism."127 
It is simply a hard fact that governments faced with true 
emergencies will not abide by ordinary legal norms, and an 
ostrach-like insistence that this is not, or should not, be true risks 
hypocrisy and the wholesale pollution of those norms even in 
periods of normal politics. 
The conventional rival to the "Business as Usual Model" is 
the "Model of Accommodation." According to this model, the 
government possesses extraordinary legal power to deal with 
extraordinary circumstances. Properly read, the Constitution 
requires the maintenance of ordinary norms to the extent that 
these norms are practical, but also allows for extraordinary 
measures to the extent that these measures are necessary. 128 
Gross attacks this model because its "flexibility is innately 
susceptible to manipulation" and because "[clhanges to the legal 
system, in times of emergency under [this modell have the 
tendency to become permanent features beyond the termination of 
the crisis."l29 
In place of these conventional approaches, Gross defends an 
"Extra-Legal Measures Model." According to this model, we 
should frankly recognize the legitimacy of government officials 
sometimes violating the law when necessary to avoid catastrophe. 
Perhaps paradoxically, a straightforward recognition of, and public 
debate about, extra-legal measures will better protect civil 
liberties than an attempt to remain within the four corners of our 
normal constitutional system. l30 
Gross's article is careful, learned, thoughtful, and closely 
argued. Yet it is ultimately wrongheaded. The basic problem is 
that he fails to accomplish his principal task: to spell out what a 
truly Extra-Legal Model would look like and how it would work. 
Gross gives the game away when he writes, late in the article, that 
his approach "must be carefully limited and well-restricted lest it 
be interpreted as permitting official lawlessness."131 Pursuant to 
this requirement, Gross meticulously sets forth a series of rules for 
the application of the model. Government's may deviate from 
constitutional norms, but only if (1) the deviation is "aimed at the 
advancement of the public good;"132 (2) it is "openly, candidly and 
126. [d. at 1043. 
127. [d. at 1096. 
128. [d. at 1059-64. 
129. [d. at 1096-97. 
130. [d. at 1021-22. 
131. [d. at 1107. 
132. [d. at 1111. 
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fully disclosed to the public;,,133 (3) the actions are ratified ex post 
by the public;134 and (4) if the public instead denounces the actions 
or remains silent, government officials are vulnerable to civil or 
criminal sanctions.135 These rules, Gross insists, "ensure that 
public officials are not above the law."136 
The problem with this formulation should be apparent. If 
Gross were truly defending extralegal measures, he would hardly 
worry that his project might be misinterpreted as "permitting 
official lawlessness" or as placing "public officials ... above the 
law." Justifying official lawlessness and placing government 
officials above the law is the whole point of an Extra Legal Model. 
Instead of defending extra-legal conduct, Gross has merely 
redefined what should count as legal. 
A useful thought experiment that tests this proposition is to 
attempt to draft a constitutional amendment that incorporates 
Gross' proposal. Without going through the exercise here, I will 
simply assert that any moderately competent lawyer would have 
little trouble in drafting such an amendment. But if this is true, it 
follows that Gross has simply proposed an interpretation of the 
Constitution that incorporates such an amendment. This 
interpretation is no different from the accommodationist model 
that he elsewhere attacks. Put differently, Gross has fallen into 
the faux political question trap. His Extra-Legal Model is not 
extra-legal at all, but instead a proposal to change the substantive 
content of constitutional law. 
To be sure, there is a way out of this trap, but it only leads 
into another. Perhaps the point is that government officials 
should be told that they are acting illegally even if, in some sense, 
they are not. Like the position that Bickel attacks Justice Black 
for adopting, and then, perhaps, adopts himself,137 Gross wants to 
manipulate public officials by misleading them. Just as we set a 
55 mile per hour speed limit to get drivers to go 60 miles per hour, 
so too we should pretend that the law is stricter than it in fact is so 
as to secure an optimal level of compliance. 
I must confess that I am unsure whether Gross embraces this 
argument. There are passages in his defense of the Extra Legal 
Model that seem to invoke it,138 but, as I read him, he also attacks 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1111-12. 
135. Id. at 1112. 
136. Id. 
137. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. 
138. Thus, Gross argues that "[tlhe knowledge that acting in a certain way 
means acting unlawfully is likely to have a significant restraining effect on 
government agents even during the emergency itself .... [Ilt seems likely that 
the mere need to cross the threshold of illegality would serve, in and of itself, 
as a limiting factor against a governmental rush to assume unnecessary 
powers." Gross, supra note 125, at 1122. 
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advocates of the Business as Usual Model for relying upon it.139 If 
Gross does indeed mean to endorse this position, he falls into the 
same difficulty that Bickel encountered: one cannot both withhold 
from government officials the knowledge that their conduct is 
actually lawful, and also candidly admit that one is withholding 
this knowledge. Gross' acknowledgment that officials should not 
really be held to the formal legal standards is like a speed limit 
sign that says "55 miles per hour, but (to tell the truth) we won't 
actually stop you if you are going 60." 
Why has a scholar as perceptive and original as Professor 
Gross fallen into these difficulties? The answer, I think, is simple. 
Had he not, he would have had no article to write. There are two 
problems. I have already spelled out the first of these in the 
previous paragraph: Gross does not know how to keep a secret. 
When Bickel faced this dilemma, he remained silent (that is, if my 
speculation about him is correct). Gross has spilled the beans. 
The second problem is more serious. Any article defending 
the Extra Legal Model requires some description of what it is and 
some norms for when it can be invoked. But as soon as the model 
is structured in this way, it ceases to be extra-legal. What makes 
conduct extra legal is precisely its resistance to rules and norms. 140 
Without a recognition of this fact, one is led into an infinite 
regress. In a true emergency, one might ask, are not government 
officials justified in overriding the rules that Gross establishes for 
139. [d. at 1044 (discussing the charge of hypocrisy directed against 
advocates of The Business As Usual Model). 
140. In his insightful analysis of the work of Carl Schmitt, Gross seems to 
recognize as much. See Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless 
Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm· 
Exception" Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825, 1841 (2000) (discussing the 
"normless character of the exception"). 
Gross strongly criticizes Schmitt, a German political thinker who embraced 
the Nazi regime, for nihilism because of Schmitt's recognition that "a decision 
emerges out of nothing, . .. does not presuppose any given set of norms, 
and ... does not owe its validity or its legitimacy to any preexisting normative 
structure." [d. at 1851-52. Of course, it is for just this reason that we feel the 
need to repress the possibility of making such decisions. Repression does not 
make the possibility go away, however. 
At the conclusion of his essay, Gross adds these words: 
There are times when academics do not enjoy the privilege of not taking 
sides and not expressing positions. And when they do, their words and 
actions matter and they stand accountable for them. Carl Schmitt 
expressed his positions clearly and acted upon them. All those who 
continue to debate his legacy must remember at all times that this is not 
some exercise conducted in the ivory towers of academia with which we 
are involved. It is a matter of life, and even more so, of death. 
[d. at 1867-68. Just so. And, one might add (although Gross surely would 
not), it is precisely for this reason that preexisting legal norms can never fully 
shield us from the terrible possibility of choice and from moral accountability 
for the choice we make. 
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rule violation? But if there are rules that govern this departure, 
might not those rules, too, be overridden? At the bottom of the 
chain is the terrifying possibility of un mediated choice that cannot 
be contained by rules. To describe the circumstances when such 
choice is appropriate is to insist on the very rules that are being 
overridden. 
If Professor Gross cannot defend an extralegal model within 
the relative freedom of the law review format, then it is surely 
expecting too much to suppose that the Justices would defend it in 
the highly stylized and constricting language of judicial opinions. 
And, of course, the Justices have not. Perhaps the best example of 
this failure can be found in the very decisions establishing judicial 
supremacy. Marbury is usually treated as the central pillar of our 
commitment to law over politics. In fact Marbury-or at least 
what Marbury has come to stand for-is a victory of politics over 
constitutional law. 
Consider the supposed obligation of other political actors-
lower court judges, the President, or the governor of a state, for 
example-to follow Supreme Court precedent. As Edwin Meese, 
among others has pointed out, this obligation elevates hierarchical 
order over constitutional principle.141 In cases where the 
Constitution and orders of the Supreme Court conflict, political 
actors are required to obey the latter rather than the former. 
There may be good reasons for this requirement. For example, 
Fred Schauer and Larry Alexander have argued that the demands 
of predictability and uniformity argue strongly for judicial 
supremacy.142 Perhaps they are right, but the important point 
here is that these demands are not rooted in the Constitution. On 
the contrary, they provide reasons why the Constitution ought not 
be followed. 
Moreover, the reasons cannot be spoken. It is therefore no 
surprise that in Cooper v. Aaron,143 the most famous argument for 
judicial supremacy, the Court not only failed to notice the conflict 
between constitutionalism and judicial power; it actually conflated 
the twO. 144 It could hardly be otherwise. The Cooper Court could 
141. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REV. 979, 983 
(1987). 
142. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Intepretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1371-81 (1997). 
143. 358 U.s. 1 (1958). 
144. According to the Cooper Court, its own interpretation of the 
Constitution simply was the supreme law of the land. Id. at 18. 
For a more recent example of the conflation, and the contradiction it produces, 
consider the position of Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor regarding the 
removal of a monument to the Ten Commandments from the lobby of the state 
Supreme Court building. According to Pryor, the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court was within his constitutional rights when he installed the monument. 
See For Pryor, Religious and Legal Rights in Conflict, THE WASH. POST, Aug 
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not recognize the anticonstitutional nature of judicial supremacy 
while also insisting on the obligation of all political actors to obey 
the Constitution. Nor could it paint itself as standing against 
anarchic and lawless assertions of power while admitting that its 
own decision amounted to such an assertion. 
Still, the fact that choice cannot be described or defended does 
not mean that it does not exist .. There is nothing inevitable about 
the way that power is exercised. Try as we might to deny the 
terrifying reality, there is always the possibility of choice. We can 
never bring this brute fact fully into consciousness, but neither can 
we ever fully repress it. Like the quantum particles that 
Heisenberg tried to measure, the political question doctrine can 
never quite be grasped. We know that it is there, but the effort to 
capture it transforms it into something tamer and less 
consequential. 
III. POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In this brief, concluding section, I want to explore some of the 
implications my analysis holds for the problem of judicial review. 
One implication is fairly obvious: the Marbury argument for 
judicial power, which emphasizes the apolitical nondiscretionary 
nature of the judicial function, will not withstand analysis. Of 
course, this is hardly news. To the extent that I have anything 
important to add to the Marbury debunking industry, it is only 
that the necessary secrecy of the political question doctrine may 
explain, even if it does not justifY, the logical fallacies in 
Marshall's opinion. 
The second implication is more counterintuitive. The secret 
political question doctrine undermines not just Marbury's 
argument, but also the argument of Marbury's critics, who would 
vest some or all interpretive authority in the political branches. 
A. The Marbury Fallacy 
Chief Justice Marshall's strategy in Marbury was to recognize 
a category of cases as posing political questions and then to bound 
and marginalize the category with legal doctrine. As the 
preceding analysis demonstrates, the strategy cannot work. To 
the extent that the political question doctrine defines a legal 
category, it is indeed marginal because it contains virtually no 
cases. Cases apparently within the category are almost always 
25,2003, at A05. Pryor nonetheless also favored the removal of the monument 
after it was declared illegal by federal courts because "The rule of law means 
that no person, including the Chief Justice of Alabama, is above the law." [d. 
It apparently did not occur to Pryor that "the rule of law" might require giving 
more weight to the Constitution than to an erroneous judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution. 
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better understood as decisions on the merits. To the extent that 
the category is nonlegal, it cannot be controlled or defined by the 
law. It is therefore simply a nonsequitur to insist, as Marshall 
does, that "[i]f some acts be examinable and others not, there must 
be some rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction. ,,145 
Nor will it do to claim that "lilt is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.",46 One 
might better assert that it is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department not to say when it is disobeying the law. 
In truth, however, the language of "province and duty" are simply 
out of place. Judges are regularly confronted with ethical choice, 
and, as Bernard Williams has effectively argued, "province and 
duty" cannot define the ethical domain. '47 
But although the opinion is not defensible, one can, perhaps, 
understand what Marshall did in Marbury. Here, we come back to 
the ironies and contradictions at Marbury's core. For reasons I 
have already spelled out, Marshall could not openly acknowledge 
the politics that drove the result. Marbury did, indeed "make" a 
political question, and, for just that reason, the explicit, legal 
answer to that question had to be nonresponsive. Whether the 
ultimate outcome of Marbury is right or wrong cannot be 
determined by legal analysis. The answer to that question 
necessarily lies outside the realm oflaw. 
B. The Problem for Marbury's Critics 
For a similar set of reasons, the political question doctrine 
poses an important difficulty for Marbury's modern critics. I have 
already addressed many of the claims of moderate critics. These 
critics would reject the kind of judicial imperialism that Marbury 
has come to stand for, but not a core judicial function to at least 
sometimes "say what the law is." As I have already argued, the 
effort to bound the domain of judicial review without taking a 
position on the merits of the claims being asserted is extremely 
difficult and, perhaps, impossible. 
The more interesting problem is posed by Marbury's radical 
critics. In an influential and important book, my colleague and 
sometimes coauthor, Mark Tushnet has argued that we should 
take the Constitution "away from the courts" and vest all 
interpretive authority in the political branches. 148 I will not 
advance here anything like the complete analysis that his theory 
145. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165. 
146. Id. at 177. 
147. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 7-8 
(1985). 
148. TUSHNET, supra note 46. 
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deserves. Instead, I will limit myself to a discussion of how that 
theory intersects with secret political questions. 
To some extent, Tushnet's position on the vesting of 
interpretive authority is entangled with his views about the merits 
of constitutional law. Tushnet defends a "thin" substantive 
Constitution that protects no more than the overall goals of the 
Constitution's preamble and the Declaration of Independence. 149 It 
does not require. extended argument to establish that this 
Constitution is thin, indeed 150_SO thin that like Dashiell 
Hammett's Thin Man, it may not exist at all. Virtually any action 
taken by the political branches could be justified under this 
version of constitutional law. Because these substantive 
requirements constrain so little, Tushnet's position may be 
reducible to that of defenders of the faux political question 
doctrine: the political branches are not answerable to courts, but 
only because courts will find virtually everything that the political 
branches do within their constitutional powers. 
Tushnet concedes that the thin constitution constrains very 
little, but he denies that it constrains not at all. 151 If his thin 
constitution indeed yields determinate outcomes, it makes a 
difference that final judgment regarding those outcomes is vested 
in the political branches. The natural question that then arises is 
why one should favor this allocation of power. Tushnet offers a 
book-length defense, which I will not summarize here. The 
important point is that this defense cannot be from within 
constitutional law. As Tushnet candidly acknowledges, it must 
instead be a political defense, grounded in a set of contestable 
political goals that are more likely to be accomplished by political 
actors than by judges.152 But of course, the trouble with such a 
political defense is that it will only be persuasive to people who 
start out sharing the same political position.l53 To the extent that 
constitutional arrangements are intended to appeal to people with 
different political positions, Tushnet's argument is bound to fail. 
There is a more serious problem. Suppose we take Tushnet's 
political aims as a given. Why would one suppose that tinkering 
with the distribution of power between courts and legislatures is 
the best means to achieve those aims? Perhaps Tushnet's claim is 
149. [d. at 11-13. 
150. Saikrashyna B. Prakash characterizes it as "anorexic." Saikrashyna B. 
Prakash, American Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 543 (1999). 
151. See TuSHNET, supra note 46, at 14. 
152. [d. at 129-53. 
153. This fact is no less true because the political positions are characterized 
in terms of "self governance" -a central concern of Tushnet's book. Self 
governance, like the thin Constitution itself, is subject to many rational, but 
contestable interpretations. Institutional arrangements favoring legislatures 
or courts will be attractive depending upon which contestable interpretation 
one adopts. 
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simply empirical. As many other scholars have demonstrated, it is 
surely true that the Supreme Court, over the sweep of its history, 
has not usually been a force for the kind of progressive change 
that Tushnet (and I) favor. l54 But a purely empirical argument 
provides no reason to suppose that this history need be endlessly 
repeated. The secret political question doctrine teaches us that 
judges need only choose differently-or we need only choose to 
appoint judges who would choose diffeqmtly-to produce 
completely different outcomes. 
Of course, Tushnet might respond that we are unlikely to 
have such judges any time soon. He is surely right on that score. 
But neither are we likely to see the political branches take the 
Constitution away from the courts any time soon. Political actors 
who had the will and ability to accomplish this goal would also 
have the will and ability to appoint judges who would make the 
goal unnecessary. 
Perhaps Tushnet thinks that the problem is not with- the 
kinds of people who become judges, but with the nature of the task 
they are asked to perform. On this view, it is more than simply an 
empirical fact that judges have, historically, behaved in a certain 
fashion. There is something about the legal exercise itself that 
leads to such behavior. We must therefore take the Constitution 
away from the courts because the Constitution itself-understood 
as law-is the enemy. Perhaps the thin constitution is attractive 
precisely because it is not law in the usual sense, and political 
enforcement of that constitution is attractive just because it is not 
legal enforcement. 
If this is Tushnet's point, then the attractiveness of his 
position will turn on one's taste for the competing virtues of 
freedom and constraint. I have only two points to add to a 
discussion of this topic. First, judges, as well as politicians, retain 
the possibility of freedom. Indeed, as I have tried to show, the 
very assertion of judicial power is an act of unmediated freedom. 
Second, because this possibility of freedom goes all the way to the 
bottom, our own choice between judicial and political 
constitutionalism poses a secret political question. 
154. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERT, HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE (1991); Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great about 
Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 191 (1998). 
